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REMEMBERING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
CHRISTINE D. GALBRAITH! 
INTRODUCTION 
Rapid advances in communication technology over the past decade 
have resulted in the previously unimaginable ability to seamlessly ex­
change ideas and data on a global basis. Yet, despite this undeniable 
progress, access to information is becoming increasingly difficult. The 
carefully balanced provisions of copyrirt law are gradually becoming 
displaced by contractual, 1 technological, and legislative3 constraints that 
permit tight control of access to and use of knowledge resources. 4 As a 
result, material that belongs in the public domain5 is being transformed 
into private property. Such a state of affairs has potentially serious con­
sequences, as the ability to access and make use of ideas and information 
is critically important to creativity, competition, innovation, and a de­
mocratic culture.6 
t Associate Professor of University of Maine School of B.S., University of
Illinois; J.D., UniveJSity of Ulinois. Many thanks to David Cluchey, CoUeen Khoury, Lois Lupica,
Martin Rogoff, and Jeffrey Maine for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. 
Additionally, I would like thank the University of Denver Sturm College of Law for inviting me to
participate in the Summit on Intellectual Property & Digital Media and present many of the ideas 
expressed in this paper. 
l. See discussion infra Part II (reviewing the various types of contractual methods often
utilized, including contracts in the form ofshrinkwrap, clickwrap, or browsewrap licenses). 
2. See discussion infra Part n (noting the increasing use of digital rights management sys­
tems (DRMs) by copyright proprietol11). 
3. See discussion irifra Part II (discussing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)). 
4. See Keith Aokil (lnte//ecnuJ/) Property and Sovereignty: Noles Toward a Cultural Geog­
raphy ofAuthorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293. 1298 (1996). 
5. Attempts to define the term ..public domain" have been the topic of considerable aca­
demic debate, as well as the subject ofnumerous scholarly articles. See, e.g., Yochai Benklcr, Free
as 1he Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 14
N.Y.U. L. REv. 354,361-62 (1999) ("The public domain is the range of uses ofinfonnation that any
person is privileged to make absent individuaiized facts that make a particular use by a particular
person unprivileged."); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and Ihe Construction ofthe 
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 38-63 (2003); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 
39 EMORY L.J. 965, 968 (1990) (defining the public domain as .. a commons that includes those
aspects of copyrighted works which copyright docs not protect ... "); Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and
Meanings ofthe Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215,256 (2002); Pamela Samuelson, Map­
ping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 148­
154 (2003). The tenn ''public domain" as used in this article consists of all nonooeopyrightable in­
fonnation, as well as the unprotected components of copyrighted works. Such a dcfmition would
necessarily comprise specific limitations aniculated in the Copyright Act, in addition to uses that
would qua1ify as fair use. 
6. Samuelson, supra note 5, at 170; see also, White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d
1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ( ..Creativity is impossible without a rich public 
domain .... Culture, like science and technology, grows by accretion, each new creator building on 
the works of those who came before."); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF 
rnECOMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 250 (2001) ("[C]reation is always the building upon some­
thing else.''); William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Jntel/ectua/ Property: An Jmmi­















136 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 84:1 
I. COPYRIGHT LAW AS A BASELINE 
Until recently, copyright law served as the baseline from which is­
sues relating to the use and ownership of creative works were decided. 
The Copyright Act provides protection only to "original works of author­
ship."7 Originality is not a statutory requirement, but a constitutional 
prerequisite for the benefits of the Act to attach to a given work. 8 To be 
original, a work must be "independently created," in other words, not 
copied from another work, and possess "at least some minimal degree of 
creativity. "9 Such conditions do not generally pose a significant hurdle, 
particularly since a relatively low level of creativity will usually suf­
fice.10 
Nonetheless, facts do not meet this modest threshold.u One of the 
"most fundamental axiom[ s] of copyright law" is that "[n ]o author may 
copyright ... the facts he [or she] narrates."12 This is because one who 
reports a particular fact has not created it, but merely discovered its exis­
tence. 13 Since factual data is not "original" in the constitutional sense, it 
is not entitled to protection but may instead be copied at will. 14 As the 
Supreme Court has explained "[t]his result is neither unfair nor unfortu­
nate," but "is the means by which copyright advances the progress of 
science and art."15 
Similarly, ideas also are not subject to copyright protection. 16 A ba­
sic principle of copyright law, the "idea/expression" dichotomy, allows 
copyright protection to attach to the expression of an idea, but not the 
idea itself. 17 Consequently, one may utilize the ideas contained within 
another's copyrighted work without seeking the creator's permission. 18 
This provides "authors the right to their original expression, but encour­
nent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 381 (1999) ("With unfettered access to 
facts, the public may gain valuable information necessary for an enlightened citizenry, while later 
authors Jlre free to create subsequent works utilizing those facts.'); Margaret Jane &!din, Property 
Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509,510 (1996) ("'[W]e cannot be creators without a robust 
public domain, a rich tradition and culture to draw upon freely."). 
7. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 2006). 
8. U.S.CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to secure '"for limited Times to Authors 
... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings ... ");see also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (declaring that "[o]rigiruolity is a constitutional requirement"). 
9. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (citing I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 2.0l[A), [B) 
(1990)). 
10. ld 
II. See id at 34445. 
12. ld (citing Harper & Row, Publishen, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,556 (1985)). 
l3. Jd at 347-48 ("'No one may claim originality as to facts' ... because facts do not owe 
their origin to an act of authorship") (quoting I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT§ 2.ll[A] 
(1990)). 
14. ld. at 350. 
15. /d. 
16. /d. (citing Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 547-48). 
17. ld 
18. ld at 349-50. 
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ages others to build freely upon the ideas ... conveyed by a work." 19 
This balance of rights between authors and the public is rooted in the 
belief that society is best served by the unrestricted flow of information 
and ideas.20 
Furthermore, depending on the circumstances, all or part of the pro­
tected portions of a copyrighted work may be used without the consent of 
the copyright holder. 21 The Copyright Act contains a number of provi­
sions that expressly restrict the exclusive rights granted by statute to the 
owner of the copyright.22 Many of these pertain only to particular types 
of uses by certain categories of individuals in specific situations/3 how­
ever, not all of the exceptions are so specialized. For example, the doc­
trine of fair use is much more far-reaching, often allowing for the use of 
excerpts from a work for purposes such as teaching, news reporting, and 
criticism without compensation to or the permission of the copyright 
holder.24 
These carefully considered constitutional and statutory limitations 
are designed to balance the rights of creators with the interests of the 
public. By providing adequate protection for authors so they have an 
incentive to create, but precluding a copyright owner's ability to control 
all uses of such works, the public domain is intended to be a rich re­
source for future creators, innovators, and participants in democratic 
culture. The ability to access and use such materials is essential since 
creativity and social progress clearly do not take place in a vacuum, but 
are cumulative in nature. In fact, "[n]othing today, likely nothing since 
we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science and technology, 
grows by accretion, each new creator building on the works of those who 
came before."25 Unfortunately, this traditional development process is 
being threatened as a result of drastic responses to technological innova­
tion. 
II. THE NEW PROPRIETARY LANDSCAPE 
Recent advances have made it possible to quickly, inexpensively, 
and effortlessly produce perfect copies of many different types of crea­
tive works. As a result, copyright holders have sought to prevent uncon­
trolled duplication from occurring. 
19. /d. 
20. See id 
21. /d. at350-51. 
22. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 107-122 (West2006). 
23. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.A. § 110 ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the follow­
ing are not infringements of copyright: ... (6) performance of a nondramatic musical work by a 
governmental body or a nonprofit agricultural or horticultural organization, in the course of an 
annual agricultural or horticultural fair or exhibition conducted by such body or organization ...."}. 
24. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107. 
25. White, 989 F.2d at 1513 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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While some fine-tuning of established doctrines may be necessary 
to account for these changes, the amount of control copyright holders 
have attempted to exert can arguably be characterized as extreme. Al­
though in limited circumstances generally unrestricted power to limit 
access and use may seem reasonable, in most situations, this is not the 
26 
case. 
Increasingly, copyright proprietors have turned to technological 
measures, such as digital rights management systems (DRMs), to strictly 
regulate access to their works. 27 These efforts have been bolstered by the 
passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 28 which proscribes 
technologies that could be used to defeat DRMs and imposes liability for 
acts of circumvention?9 This legislation is somewhat radical since tradi­
tionally "Congress has achieved the objectives of the Constitution's 
Copyright Clause 'by regulating the use of information-not the devices 
or means by which the information is [obtained]. "'30 Such developments 
are particularly troublesome in light of the fact that "preventing access is 
now often tantamount to preventing use. "31 
To the extent all hurdles to access are overcome, further restrictions 
on use are frequently present, as copyright holders attempt to prevent all 
uncompensated and unauthorized uses of their works.32 In an effort to 
attain this goal, standard form contracts, often in the form of shrink­
wrap,33 clickwrap/4 or browsewrap35 licenses are frequently utilized. 
26. Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 AM. J. 
COMP. L 323. 360-61 (2004). 
27. Stephen M. Kramarsky, Copyright Enforcement in the Internet Age: The Law and Tech­
nology ofDigital Rights Management, 11 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y I, 10 (2001); 
Symposium: The Law & Technology ofDigital Rights Management, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 697, 
736-37 (2003); Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws 
Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161, 161-62, 183 (1997); Bechtold, supra note 
26. at 323-24. 
28. Pub. L. No. I 05-304. 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
29. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1203-1204 (West 2006). For further discussion of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, see generally Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: 
Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999); 
David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History: The Sweet and Sour Spots ofthe DMCA S Com­
mentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 909 (2002); Orin S. Kerr, A Lu/cewann Defense of the Digital Mil­
lennium Copyright Act, in COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 163 (Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews eds.• 2002); Craig Allen Nard, The 
DMCA S Anti-Device Provisions: Impeding the Progress of the Usefol Arts?, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & 
PoL 'y I 9 (2002); Matt Jackson, Using Technology to Circumvent the Law: The DMC.A. 's Push to 
Privatize Copyright, 23 HASTINGS COMM. &ENT. L.J. 607 (2001). 
30. David Nimmer, A Riffon Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. 
REv. 673. 683 (2000) (citing H.R. REP. No. 105-551. pt. 2. at 24 (1998)). 
31. Jacqueline Lipton, A Framework for lnfonnation Law and Policy, 82 OR. L. REv. 695, 
762 (2003). 
32. Maureen Ryan, Cyberspace as Public Space: A Public Trust Paradigm for Copyright in a 
Digital World. 79 OR. L. REv. 647.661 (2000). 
33. See. e.g .• Register.com, Inc. v. Verla. Inc .• 356 F.3d 393, 428 (2d Cir. 2004) ("A shrink-
wrap license typically involves (I) notice of a license agreement on product packaging (i.e.• the 
shrinkwrap), (2) presentation of the full license on docwnents inside the package, and (3) prohibited 
access 
. 
to the product without an express indication of acceptance. Generally, in 
. 
the shrinkwrap
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These "agreements"36 often contain harsh provisions that seek to ~rohibit 
actions that are clearly allowed under the Copyright Act, such as conduct 
that would undoubtedly qualify as fair use. Additionally, the use of facts 
and ideas contained in copyrighted works is often heavily regulated, as 
they are increasingly viewed as mere commodities in the marketplace­
even though they constitute the building blocks of knowledge and are 
supposed to remain within the public domain.37 
Lawmakers and judges have been quick to support these techno­
logical and contractual restraints implemented by copyright proprietors 
despite the fact that they undeniably alter the delicate balance struck by 
the Copyright Act to the detriment of the public. Increasingly, all unre­
munerated uses of information are perceived as unacceptable assaults on 
the rights of copyright holders. 38 This is due in large part to the fact that 
legislators promulgating statutes and adjudicators resolving disputes 
concerning data have failed to adequately take into account the multi­
dimensional problems involved in disputes concerning access to informa­
tion. The focus is often inappropriately centered on the tangible property 
within which information is contained, for example in a software pro­
gram or a computer server. Additionally, once an owner of such prop­
erty is ascertained, all of the conventional attributes of ownership are 
context. the consumer does not manifest assent to the shrinkwmp tenns at the time of purchase; 
instead. the consumer manifests assent to the terms by later actions." (citations omitted)). 
34. See Register.com, inc., 356 F.3d at 429 (defming a "clickwrap license" as one which 
presents ''the potential licensee (i.e., the end·user) 'with a message on his or her computer screen, 
requiring that the user manifest his or her assent to the tenns of the license agreement by clicking on 
an icon."') (citing Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., ISO F. Supp. 2d 585, 593-94 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001)). 
35. See, e.g., Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 756, 
782 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (defining a .. browsewrap license" as a license that is "typically part of a web 
site-its tenns may be posted on the site's home page or may otherwise be accessible via a hyper­
link" and explaining that "[i]n contrast to clickwrap licenses, a user may download software under a 
browsewrap license prior to manifesting assent to its terms." (citations omitted)). 
36. The validity of these agreements has been the subject of extensive scholarly discussion. 
See generally Beiuder, supra note 5, at42940 (discussing copyright law and the scope of the p~blic 
domain)~ J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: 
Reconciling Freedom ofContract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 
906 (1999) (examining the practice of contracting around federal intellectual property law); Ray­
mond 1. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property 
Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 827,877-78 (1998) (exploring the relationship between contract and 
copyright law); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market­
Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 57, 71 (1997) (discussing the competing interests 
involved in freedom of contract and preservation of the public domain); Niva Elkin~Koren, Copy­
right Policy and the Limits ofFreedom ofContract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 93, 106 (1997) (dis­
cussing whether parties should be allowed to contract around copyright). 
37. Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 187 
(1992); Ryan, supra note 32, at 661,669-70. Patry, supra note 6, at 368-69. (''Copying such mate­
rial promotes the progress of science by keeping the basic building blocks of knowledge free for aU 
to use ...."); see also Lipton, supra note 31, at 738; Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/ 
lnfonnation Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1294·95 (2000). 
38. Litman, supra note 37, at 206 ("Courts increasingly see uncompensated uses of copy­
righted works as invasions of the rights in the copyright bundle."); see also Ryan, supra note 32, at 
661. 
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normally granted, including the right to exclude. 39 As a result, almost 
insurmountable obstacles are faced by any other party whose interests 
might be affected by a lack of access or an inability to utilize the re­
source, as the burden almost always falls on these other parties to explain 
why the previously identified owner's rights should be limited.40 
Such a myopic view of property rights allows for the tight control of 
access to and use of information contained within the tangible property. 
This problem is often most pronounced in the Internet context where 
lawmakers and judges have not only treated cyberspace as though it were 
virtually equivalent to a place in the physical world, but seem to believe 
that all of its constituent parts must be privately owned by someone or 
something that has absolute power over the property.'' Ubiquitous in 
legislation affecting and judicial opinions concerning cyberspace is the 
granting of rights to private parties, thereby providing them with the abil­
ity to exclude whomever or whatever they choose.'2 
Illustrative of this presumption toward privatization is the case of 
eBay v. Bidder's Edge.'3 Plaintiff eBay brought suit against Bidder's 
Edge for using a software robot to access and gather factual data con­
tained on eBay's publicly accessible Internet site, despite the fact that its 
computer system had not been harmed by Bidder's Edge's robotic activ­
ity.44 In granting the preliminary injunction against Bidder's Edge, the 
court held that eBay had a "fundamental property right to exclude others 
from its computer system.'"'' Determinations such as these allow website 
owners to restrict who and what may enter, and consequently make use 
of, the information contained on even a publicly accessible website. 
Furthermore, these decisions generally fail to recognize the benefits that 
inure from a diverse, open network. The end results of such judgments 
are considerable impediments to public access to ideas and information. 
CONCLUSION 
It is imperative that judges and policy ma,kers give more compre­
hensive attention to all of the interests implicated in controversies involv­
39. See Ryan, supra note 32, at 692. 
40. See JOSEPH WILILAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERlY I 0 (2000). 
41. Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REv. 521,532-33 (2003). 
Courts have assumed not only that cyberspace is a place akin to the physical world, but 
further that any such place must be privately owned by someone who has total control 
over the property. This is a common assumption these days~ it sometimes seems as 
though our legal system is obsessed with the idea that anything with value must be owned 
by someone. 
/d. 
42. Ryan, supra note 32, al 692; see also Morton J. Horwitz, Technology, Values, and the 
Justice System: Conceptualizing the Right ofAccess to Technology, 79 WASH. L. REv. 105, J16 
(2004). 
43. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
44. See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1060&63. 
45. /d. at 1067. 
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ing materials which arguably belong in the public domain. This must 
include acknowledgment of the fact that the ability to access and make 
use of a robust, ever-expanding public domain is essential to the progress 
of society .46 Such resources allow the public to gain valuable informa­
tion necessary for an "enlightened citizenry.'"'7 A prodigious public do­
main advances learning, knowledge, and creativity by permitting later 
authors and innovators to build on prior works and discoveries. Ulti­
mately, we must recognize the way the structure of intellectual property 
rights reflects the values we find important and the type of society we 
wish to create.48 · 
46. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech andDemocratic Culture: A Theory ofFreedom of 
Expressionfor the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. I, 3-4 (2004). 
47. Patry,supranote6,at381. 
48. Laura S. Underkuffier-Freund, Property: A Special Right, 11 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 
I046 (1996) ("Questions about the kind of society that we are, and the kind of society that we wish 
to become, must be inherent parts of the interpretation of (property rights].''); SINGER, supra note 40, 
at 155; Jacqueline Lipton, lnfonnation Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 
173-74 (2004) r·Propeny ownership, like information property ownership, has powerful social 
consequences."); JOSEPH WILLJAM SINGER., THE EDGES OF TiiE FIELD: LESSONS ON TilE 
OBLIGATIONS OF 0WNERSHIP90~91 (2000); see also STEVEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 
149 ( 1990) ("Property discloses much about societies and persons .... First for all societies. if one 
describes the institution of property as it exists in a society, the description reveals something impor~ 
tant about that society."); Ryan, supra note 32, at 647 ("[I]t is important to identify the values we are 
promoting when resolving current issues regarding infonnation as property."); JEDEDIAH PURDY, 
FOR COMMON THINGS: IRONY, TRUST, AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICA TODAY 131 (1999} ("Every 
law and each political choice is in part a judgment about the sort of country we will inhabit and the 
son of lives we will lead.''). 
